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Abstract I offer an analysis of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and its rel-
evancy for the scientific endeavour. I submit that the world is not, and cannot
be, rational – only some brained beings are. The Principle of Sufficient Reason
is not a necessary truth nor a physical law. It is just a guiding metanomolog-
ical hypothesis justified a posteriori by its success in helping us to unveil the
mechanisms that operate in Nature.
Keywords Ontology · physics · explanation · causality
What necessity would have stirred it up to grow later rather than
earlier, beginning from nothing?...Nor will the force of conviction ever
permit anything to come to be from what is not.
Parmenides.
1 Introduction
The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), although famously espoused and ad-
vocated by rationalist philosophers such as Spinoza and Leibniz in the XVII
century, has an illustrious history that pervades the whole Western thought
(see Schopenhauer 2012). Anaximander is usually credited as the first thinker
that invoked the PSR in philosophical reasoning on the occasion of his argu-
ment for the earth to be at rest at the center of the universe. Anaximander
claimed that since space is isotropic there is no reason for the earth to move
in any direction. Then, it does not move. In other words, a symmetry should
Instituto Argentino de Radioastronomı´a (IAR, CCT La Plata, CONICET)
C.C. No. 5, 1894, Villa Elisa, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Tel.: +54-221-482-4903 ext. 115
Fax: +54-221-425-4909 ext 117
E-mail: romero@iar-conicet.gov.ar
2 Gustavo E. Romero
not be broken if there is not a sufficient reason for breaking it (see McKirahan
1994 on Anaximander’s view). The principle was later adopted by Parmenides,
Leucippus and other ancient philosophers. In the Middle Ages, Aquinas argued
from the PSR to reject an infinite regress: he held that there must be some
reason for the whole chain of causes. Spinoza stated the principle in his famous
major work, the Ethics (Spinoza 1985). In E1p11d2, we read:
For each thing there must be assigned a cause, or reason, both for
its existence and for its nonexistence.
For Spinoza not only there must be a reason for what there is, but also for what
there is not. This seems to be a particularly strong version of the principle.
Leibniz introduced the expression ‘Principle of Sufficient Reason’ and he is
its best known exponent and defender. In the Monadology, sec. 32, he wrote:
There can be no fact real or existing, no statement true, unless there
be a sufficient reason, why it should be so and not otherwise, although
these reasons usually cannot be known by us.
And in his second letter to Samuel Clarke, he simplifies (Leibniz and Clarke
2000):
The principle of sufficient reason, namely, that nothing happens
without a reason.
This is not far from the only extant fragment of Leucippus (Taylor 1999):
Nothing happens in vain, but everything from reason and necessity.
The PSR was under attack in the XVIII century by the empiricists, es-
pecially David Hume. Hume critique of causality can be easily extended to
sufficient reason. Logical positivists and modern analytic philosophers have
also distrusted of the PSR, in part because of its alleged theological implica-
tions and in part because its dubious nomological status (see Pruss 2010 for a
broad review of contemporary criticisms).
In this brief paper I want to clarify the role of the PSR in science. I maintain
that this principle, properly understood, plays an important role in scientific
research. Far from being an obscure tinge from an outdated rationalism in
search of theological justifications, I submit that the PSR is a fundamental
working hypothesis in the toolkit of any research scientist. But before dis-
cussing epistemological issues related to the principle, we should recognise
that under the single acronym ‘PSR’ there are a variety of statements of dif-
ferent import and strength, as well as some vagueness that must be dispelled.
Let’s see.
2 The Principle of Sufficient Reason
In his book devoted to the PSR, Alexander Pruss (2010) collects the several
ways in which the principle has been enunciated (see also Oppy 2009 for a
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rational reconstruction). I distinguish four different main forms of the principle
(Pruss 2010)1:
– PSR 1. Everything that is the case must have a reason why it is the case.
– PSR 2. Necessarily every true proposition has an explanation.
– PRS 3. Every event has a cause.
– PSR 4. Ex nihilo nihil fit (nothing comes from nothing).
These statements are certainly not equivalent. They have presumably dif-
ferent strength and meaning. But in order to compare them and their import,
vagueness should be removed from some terms that appear in the statements.
Words such as ‘reason’, ‘explanation’, ‘cause’, and ‘nothing’ should be care-
fully defined in the present context before we can discuss the principle and its
place in science. In the next section I proffer elucidations of these terms.
3 Reason, explanation, and causality
The word ‘reason’ is polysemous. I differentiate two main meanings (e.g. Bunge
2003): (1) a mental faculty consisting in thinking in a cogent way, and (2) an
ontological justification of the occurrence of an event or a state of affairs. PSR
1 does not refer to properties of the brain, so we better try to refine (2) so as to
make of PSR 1 a meaningful statement. An ontological justification for events
and states of affairs might be the specification of a sufficient system of causes.
In such a case PSR 1 → PSR 3. I discuss causes and PSR 3 below. But there
is another possible meaning of ‘ontological justification’: the specification of a
system of laws and facts such that given a number of conditions A, then the
event or state of affairs B follows. For instance, the specification of the law of
gravitation and the masses of all objects in the solar system, plus some ade-
quate initial conditions, justify the state of motion of the earth with respect to
the sun. In this sense, we can say that there is a ‘reason’ for the earth motion
around the sun. I call this type of justification ‘nomological justification’. Un-
der this interpretation, PSR 1 is not a law, but a metanomological statement
(Bunge 1961, 1967). Since laws can be understood as constant relations among
properties of things, PSR 1 would be tantamount to
– PSR 1a. All events are lawful.
Let us now turn to PSR 2. This version refers to propositions, i.e. classes of
statements, and not to the world. As it has been enunciated, it is a statement
1 These forms do not exhaust of course all statements that have been proposed as possible
enunciations of the PSR, but are, in my opinion, those more commonly adopted in the
philosophical literature.
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about our uses of language. Since explanation is an epistemic operation and not
a semantic one, in its current form PSR 2 is meaningless. It can be minimally
modified, nevertheless, to become a meaningful statement, namely:
– PSR 2a. Necessarily every true proposition satisfies truth conditions.
This is trivially true, but says nothing about the world. Since the propo-
nents of the PSR think that they are saying something about the way the
world actually is, we can attempt a different approach replacing propositions
by what they represent: facts. We obtain:
– PSR 2b. Necessarily every fact has an explanation.
I should say a bit more here about explanation if we are going to make any
sense of this statement. To explain a fact is to show how it happens. This ‘to
show’ means to make explicit a mechanism that produces the fact (see Bunge
2006). A mechanism is a system of processes that occur lawfully. So, PSR 2b
can be rendered into:
– PSR 2c. Every fact results from lawful processes.
Since there is no need for the word ‘necessary’ given the unrestricted uni-
versal quantification, I dropped it in this reformulation. PSR 2c is very similar
to PSR 1a. If we define facts as either events (changes in the state of things)
or states, and admit that events are related to either previous states or other
events, then both statements have the same import.
I turn now to PSR 4. In the formulation given above, PSR 4 is defective
since ‘nothing’ is not a thing but a concept: an empty domain of quantification.
I propose the following reformulations of PSR 4:
– PSR 4a. There are not bare facts.
PSR 4a means that all facts are part of a system of facts, the world, where
no event occurs isolated. Although this implies a nomic determinism, it is
certainly not a causal determinism, as the one required by PSR 3. Using un-
restricted quantification2 we can rewrite PSR 4a as:
– PSR 4b. Every fact results lawfully from previous facts.
This form is quite similar to PSR 2c.
In order to discuss PSR 3 it is convenient to say a few words about causality
before.
Causation is a mode of event generation (Bunge 1979, Romero and Pe´rez
2013). It is not the only way of generating events. Particle decays, as those of
elementary particles, such as muons and taus, generate events without causal
origination: the existence of no previous event is necessary for the occurrence
of these processes. The same is valid for the decay of composed particles such
as the various mesons, the neutron, or any spontaneous decay, from radioactive
2 ∀x Px↔ ¬∃x ¬Px.
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nuclei to the implosion of a star. The events of decay are legal (they occur in
conformity to the probabilistic laws of quantum interactions, or other laws or
even complexes of laws), but these events and processes are not causal: there
is no prior event that we can call the ‘cause’ of these occurrences.
I suggest the following definition of causal interaction between events3: two
events e1 and e2 are causally related iff there is at least a process p such that
e2 is a component of p and e1 is a component as well, and it is never the case
that e1 is not a component of p. Then I say that e1 is a cause of e2. The event
e2 is an effect of e1. In symbols:
e1 B e2.
The process p involving e2 can never occur without the existence of e1.
The world is legal and determinate, but not strictly causal. There are events
that are not causally related and processes that are not causally originated. If
these is correct, then PSR 3 is a false statement4.
From our analysis of different proposals for the formulation of the PSR we
conclude that, once all the terms have been conveniently defined, the different
statements collapse into the following one:
– PSR∗. Every fact results lawfully from previous facts.
In this formulation ‘fact’ means ‘a state or a change of state of a thing’. An
event is a change of state, so a fact is either a state or an event in a thing. I
propose PSR∗ as the only version of the PSR that is compatible with modern
science.
Before discussing the ontological and epistemological status of PSR∗, I will
briefly comment on the system of all things, to which the principle is applied.
4 The intelligibility of the world
The PSR is equated sometimes to the statement, likely inspire by Hegel, that
“reality is rational”. This can adopt occasionally the form (1) “the world is
rational” or (2) “the universe is reasonable”. I submit that all these sentences
are nonsense. Reality is a concept: the set of all real entities. As all sets, it
lacks of independent existence, it is a fiction, albeit a convenient one. The
word ‘rational’, to the contrary, qualifies a type of behaviour: the one that is
guided by reason, i.e. by cogent thinking. Sets do not think, so reality cannot
be rational, hence (1) makes no sense. The world, on the other hand, can be
3 For more sophisticated definitions see the mentioned works by Bunge (1979) and Romero
and Pe´rez (2013), as well as Bunge (1977).
4 I owe to an anonymous referee the interesting comment, worth to be cited here, that
though reasons are not causes, a reason may become a cause in the head of a decision-maker
who proceeds to act in accordance with a causal hypothesis which may explain why Spinoza,
Leibniz and others treated both terms as synonymous.
6 Gustavo E. Romero
understood as the system of all events; the universe, as the system of all things
(see Romero 2013 for a detailed characterisation). Both world and universe are
concrete entities, but the faculty of thinking, and of thinking reasonably and
rationally, is not among their known properties. To the best of our current
knowledge, only beings endowed with brains of notable plasticity are able to
think. It is difficult to understand what would mean for the universe to think,
and even more difficult for the world (since the world is changeless – Romero
2013). At best, sentences (1) and (2) are false statements. In the worst case,
they are not even statements.
Perhaps what is meant by this type of talk about the world is that it
is comprehensible for us, humans. This, in turn, means that we can produce
conceptual representations of all aspects of the world. Although we can assume
we can do that as a guiding methodological principle for our research (“there
are not forbidden topics”), there is no certainty, I think, that we will ever be
able to develop the conceptual tools for a full representation of the world and
the means to test such representations (see Rescher 1999). This should not be
a hindrance to our attempts at deepening our understanding of reality. It is
in this enterprise where the PSR becomes prominent.
5 The status of the PSR
I propose that the correct enunciation of the PSR is PSR∗: every fact results
lawfully from previous facts. This is a general statement about facts and laws.
It is a statement neither necessary nor obviously true. Since it claims that
laws cover the whole range of facts, it is a metanomological statement. It is
a condition upon law statements: they ought to cover all the realm of reality.
The epistemological status of such a statement is methodological: it is guiding
principle for generating knowledge. In every situation where apparent brute
facts seem to appear, the PSR∗ recommends the search for deeper laws. Any
working scientist adopts this principle when an apparent inconsistency appears
in the data at hand. Instead of simply assuming brute facts, the responsible
scientist proposes a revision of the data or, as a last resource, a modification
of the accepted ontology. For instance, the non-conservation of energy, mo-
mentum, and spin in some particle decays led the physicist Wolfgang Pauli
to postulate the existence of the neutrino in 1930. Recently, the apparent
violation of special relativity in neutrino experiments led some scientists to
speculate about some exotic explanations and, ultimately, to find a mistake in
the interpretation of the experimental data due to some systematics not origi-
nally taken into account. In these an many other instances of scientific inquiry
the researchers are guided by the non-explicit assumption of PSR∗: there must
be a lawful explanation of each experimental or observational situation.
Not being the PSR a necessary truth, the theological scruples of some
philosophers are groundless. The principle reflects our disposition to solve
problems in science, but cannot be used to make direct predictions. It is too
a general statement for that. Predictions can be made from law statements
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plus a set of conditions obtained from information about particular states of
affairs. We cannot infer the existence of something, e.g. the neutrino, from
the PSR alone. The actual process is that we propose the existence of the
neutrino to satisfy a well tested law (e.g. momentum conservation). We are
motivated by the PSR to demand a fully lawful situation. Ultimately, it will
be the experiment that will confirm whether the neutrino exists or not.
It is important to notice that quantum transitions and other intrinsically
probabilistic phenomena are not violations of the PSR∗ and do not require any
special interpretation of quantum mechanics. Transitions and decays occur in
perfect agreement with the law statements of quantum mechanics. Actually,
the probabilistic predictions of quantum mechanics are extraordinarily well
corroborated, to the point that most of our modern technology is based on
them. I cannot think of a worse attempt to rebut the PSR∗ than invoking
quantum mechanics. Amazingly, some philosophers have tried to do it...in
papers written with computers that operate in accordance with the laws of
quantum mechanics.
6 Closing remarks
The Principle of Sufficient Reason is a metanomological statement that pro-
vides a useful guide in the pursuit of scientific knowledge. It is not a law of
nature nor a necessary statement. It is, nonetheless, used by scientist in their
everyday work, and has been assumed in many of the most important discov-
eries of science. This is reason enough for a principle of sufficient reason to be
well coveted into the toolbox of any serious researcher.
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